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Protected areas, wildlife conservation and local welfare 
 
 
Abstract  
The establishment and expansion of protected areas in Africa have been motivated by the 
aspiration of increased wildlife abundance. During the past decades, however, this practise 
has been subject to a massive debate. While some claim that protected areas have failed in 
preserving African wildlife, others claim that existing protected areas are successful. This 
paper adds to this debate by presenting a bio-economic analysis of protected area expansion. 
The model considers a hunter-agrarian community located on the border of a protected area. 
An expansion of the protected area means less land for agricultural cultivation and hunting. 
Depending on the economic conditions in these activities, it is demonstrated that protected 
area expansion may reduce the degree of wildlife conservation. In addition, it may reduce the 
welfare of the local people. 
 
Key words: protected areas, wildlife conservation, hunting, agriculture, local welfare 
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1. Introduction 
The initial approach to preserve natural resources in Africa had its roots in the Western 
environmentalist movement of the 20th century. This approach saw the establishment of large 
areas of national parks and reserves as the foremost priority for African conservation ([16], 
[19] and [31]). The objective of this management system was to protect wild animals and 
natural habitats through prohibition or restriction of wildlife utilization. Setting aside areas 
for national parks and game reserves is still the predominating management strategy ([31]). 
The control and management of protected areas are usually vested in the State, which reaps 
economic benefits from wildlife tourism. In contrast, gazetting land for wildlife protection 
has displaced rural communities and curtailed their access to natural resources that they 
previously had access to. Land for cultivation and pasture has been lost and harvesting of 
wildlife in these areas has been deemed illegal ([16], [19], [31], and [33]). In addition, local 
communities bear the costs of living with wildlife through agricultural damage induced by 
animals roaming on agricultural land. Hence, while the State reaps the benefits of protected 
areas, the costs are borne at the local level.  
 
The idea of protected areas was motivated by the aspiration of increased wildlife abundance. 
The continuing expansion of protected areas in Africa reflects that this perception is still 
prevalent. However, the increasing poaching pressure has led to a growing recognition that 
protected areas have failed in their goals of preserving wildlife ([12], [16], [20] and [30]-
[31]). Martin [20], for instance, claims that Africa has made the mistake of gazetting too 
many and too large areas to be able to meet the minimum operating costs required in order to 
conserve and protect wildlife in these areas. He pictures an inevitable situation where budgets 
are to small to prevent illegal exploitation, leading all areas to deteriorate simultaneously (see 
also [11] and [17]).  
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Other critics of protected areas have pointed to the unfairness of excluding local people from 
access to parks and natural resources they have used for centuries. Kiss [16] and Swanson 
and Barbier [31], among others, argue that the lack of economic compensation to local people 
for loss of access has led to a failure of protected areas. They argue that it is necessary to 
correct this distortion in order to promote wildlife conservation, and suggest that this is 
achievable through revenue sharing in wildlife related activities. They believe that local 
people will respond to such benefits by reducing the exploitation of wildlife1. Such and other 
initiatives to promote sustainable development in surrounding areas are today widespread 
through Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs). See, e.g., van Schaik 
and Rijksen [32] for an overview of the history of ICDPs. 
 
Although the critique of parks is massive, others claim that protected areas work well. Bruner 
et al. [5] compare the current conditions inside parks with their surrounding areas and find 
that parks are better conditioned than their surrounding areas. In case of hunting, they find 
that the impact of this activity on wildlife in parks is considerably less compared with 
surrounding areas. However, Bruner et al. [5] do not investigate the effectiveness of protected 
areas with respect to the total wildlife population, that is, the sum of wildlife living in the 
protected area and its surroundings. Because wildlife often migrates over large areas, this 
raises the question whether hunting in outer areas can prove to make protected areas 
counterproductive, even if wildlife management authorities were to succeed in defending 
protected areas against intrusion.    
 
This question is the starting point of the present paper. The paper presents a bio-economic 
model where wildlife disperses over a fixed area or ecosystem. The ecosystem contains two 
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sub-areas, the protected area and the surrounding area. In the surrounding area a group of 
local peasants utilize the outer land for agricultural production and wildlife hunting. Hence, 
there are two alternative uses of protected land, namely as input in agricultural production 
and as hunting ground. It is further assumed that hunting is not allowed in the protected area 
and that law enforcement is effectively preventing illegal hunting here. However, the local 
people have legal rights to exploit the land in the outer area and wildlife roaming outside the 
park. That is, they have user rights to land and wildlife in the outer area2. Finally, the size of 
the protected area is determined by the State and considered as exogenous in the model. 
Within this setting, this paper aims at investigating the impact of an exogenous expansion of 
a protected area on the total wildlife stock and the welfare of the local people. 
 
This paper is an extension of the research of marine reserves presented by Conrad [10], 
Hannesson [13], Pezzey et al. [23], and Sanchirico and Wilen [25]. Sanchirico and Wilen 
[24], for instance, consider two fishing patches, initially characterised as open-access 
fisheries (entry until zero rents)3. A marine reserve is created by closing one patch for fishing. 
The fish stock in the open patch is determined by a fixed cost-price ratio and is not altered by 
closing the other patch. Based on these assumptions, a marine reserve increases the aggregate 
biomass of the two patches for every ecological system.  
 
Sanchirico and Wilen [25] also focus on the economic impact of a marine reserve. Because 
free access to the open patch means zero rent, they define the fishery as better off if a marine 
reserve increases the total harvest. As the fish stock disperses between the patches, they show 
that the effect on total harvest of closing one patch is positive if increased dispersal between 
the reserve and the open patch compensates for the foregone harvest in the reserve. Also 
Hannesson [13] shows that marine reserve creation increases the aggregate fish stock when 
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there is open access to the area outside the reserve. However, he demonstrates that a marine 
reserve of a moderate size will have only a small conservation effect, compared with open 
access to the entire area inhabited by the stock. In addition, he shows that the impact on the 
aggregate catch depends on the size of the marine reserve. 
 
Marine habitats, however, differ from terrestrial habitats in that there are no alternative uses 
of marine reserves. In order to draw a line to marine reserves, this paper makes a distinction 
between two policies of land protection. The difference between these policies lies in the type 
of land gazetted. One alternative is to establish a protected area by gazetting non-cultivated 
land only. In such a case, there is no alternative use of the protected area except hunting. This 
policy is therefore quite similar to marine reserve creation and the analysis demonstrates that 
it promotes wildlife conservation. The mechanism works through the allocation of labour 
between agriculture and hunting: Restricted hunting grounds reduce the labour productivity 
in hunting relatively to the productivity of labour in agriculture. Consequently, the local 
people will respond to a protected area expansion by devoting less labour towards hunting.    
 
However, rapid human population growth in Africa has forced humans to bring their 
agricultural activities ever more close to wildlife habitats (see [11] and [20]). The second 
alternative is therefore to expropriate cultivated land for wildlife protection. In this case the 
protected area does not only close off an area for hunting, it also withdraws land previously 
used in agriculture. Consequently, an additional alternative cost of habitat protection is 
present, namely the foregone return from crop production. The analysis shows, in contrast to 
marine reserves, that this policy may cause wildlife degradation: If the impact of reduced 
hunting grounds on labour productivity in hunting is low compared with the impact of less 
agricultural land on labour productivity in agriculture, then land expropriation leads the local 
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people to increase the input of labour in hunting. Increased hunting pressure in the outer area 
may then reduce the wildlife stock.    
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ecological model, while 
the behaviour of the local people follows in section 3. The impact on wildlife conservation 
and local welfare of protected area creation is investigated in section 4. A summary and 
discussion follows in section 5.  
 
2. The ecological model 
Consider an area or ecosystem of fixed size divided in two sub-areas; a protected area and an 
outer area. The ecological modelling is identical to Hannesson [13] who looks at species 
dispersing between the sub-areas in a density-dependent way. This means that wildlife 
migrate to the relatively less dense area (see e.g., [24]). Because there are no physical 
obstructions, e.g. fencing, separating the parkland from the open area, animals roam freely 
between the sub-areas. It is further assumed, as already mentioned, that wildlife harvesting 
only takes place when the species are outside the protected area.  
 
In the following, some restrictive assumptions are made about the quality of land. First, land 
is considered homogenous, i.e. every part of the ecosystem is equally suitable as habitat for 
wildlife. Secondly, although agricultural production takes place in the outer area, it is 
assumed to be no incompatibility in land use. That is, there is no negative impact on the 
living conditions of wildlife of adding more land to agricultural production4. However, in 
reality, unexploited land may generate more wildlife than agricultural land as land clearing, 
fencing and so forth result in poorer conditions and smaller refuges for wildlife (see [22]). 
This may be captured, as in Huffaker et al. [15], by assuming a smaller intrinsic growth rate 
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of wildlife in the outer area. However, in order to take a first step into the main issue 
presented here, no incompatibles in land uses are assumed to be present. See also section 5. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the conservation effect of altering the size of the 
protected sub-area. An increase in the size of this area is followed by an equal reduction in 
the outer area. Because of this, the migration rates between the sub-areas are specified as 
dependent on the size of the respective areas. Technically, the probability of an animal being 
located in the protected area or the outer area equals the size of the respective areas. Now, 
assume that the size of the ecosystem is normalized to one. A fraction w of this area is 
gazetted as protected land and consequently, )w( −1  is the size of the outer area. Let X(t) be 
the density of the stock in the protected area at time t, while Y(t) is the density in the outer 
area at time t. In the following, the time subscript is omitted. The size of the wildlife stock in 
the protected area and the outer area is wX and Y)w( −1  respectively, so that the aggregate 
stock equals Y)w(wXS −+= 1 .  
 
Let 0≥z  be the moving rate of wildlife, i.e. the rate at which an animal moves to bring it to 
the nearest suitable spot for grazing or prey5. 0=z  means that the animals do not move 
around at all. The rate of dispersal of the stock in the protected area is then zwX. )w( −1  is 
the probability that the moving animal will migrate out of the reserve. The migration out of 
the reserve is therefore wX)w(z −1 . To translate this into change in stock density in the outer 
area, we divide it by the size of that area. Hence, the increase in the density of wildlife in the 
outer area due to migration from the protected area is zwX. Similarly, Y)w(zw −1 is the 
migration from the outer area onto protected land. The reduction in the density of wildlife in 
the outer area due to migration to the conservation area is then zwY. In the same way, the 
change in the stock density in the conservation area due to migration from the outer area is 
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Y)w(z −1 , while the stock density in the conservation area is reduced by X)w(z −1  due to 
migration to the outer area. 
 
Because of the non-incompatibility of land, the carrying capacity per square kilometre is 
equal in each sub-area and therefore normalized to one. Natural growth is assumed to take 
place in both sub-areas and is given by a logistic growth function. The rate of change in the 
density of wildlife in the two sub-areas is given by 
 
(1) )XY)(w(z)X(rXdt/dX −−+−= 11    
 
(2) h)YX(zw)Y(rYdt/dY −−+−= 1  
 
Here, h is the harvesting rate, while r is the intrinsic growth rate. Note that the rate of change 
in the aggregate stock is given by dt/dY)w(dt/wdXdt/dS −+= 1 . If the whole ecosystem 
is gazetted for wildlife protection ( 1=w ), then XS = and )S(rSdt/dS −= 1 . In the same 
way, with no protection ( 0=w ) YS =  and h)S(rSdt/dS −−= 1 . Throughout the analysis 
it is assumed that 10 << w .  
 
In absence of man, 0h = , Figure 1 illustrates the isoclines of (1) and (2). This figure is quite 
similar to the graphical demonstration of a two-patch density-dependent system in Sanchirico 
and Wilen [25]. Here, the marginal migration rates are below the maximum specific growth 
rate so that 01 >− r/zw  and 011 >−− r/)w(z . See also Skonhoft and Armstrong [27]. 
This makes sense because a system with a migration exceeding the intrinsic growth is likely 
to fail in sustaining an ecological equilibrium with positive biomass within each patch. The 
X-isocline is a strictly convex function of X and runs through the point (1,1). Above the 
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isocline, the natural growth and dispersion from the outer area exceed the dispersion out of 
the reserve so that 0dt/dX > . The opposite occurs below the isocline. The Y-isocline is a 
strictly concave function of X and runs through the point (1,1). Below the isocline, dt/dY  is 
positive, whereas above, dt/dY  is negative.  
 
 Figure 1 about here 
 
In absence of man and migration below the intrinsic growth, it will therefore be a unique 
equilibrium with stock densities equal to one. Hence, the aggregate stock equals one in 
equilibrium. It can be demonstrated that the equilibrium is stable6. The feasible region for an 
interior solution of the system is found in the area closed by the isoclines and the axes. The 
size of this region depends on the biological parameters of the model. If the moving rate z 
approaches zero, i.e. a system of closed and independent patches, the individual stocks 
collapse to zero or the carrying capacity of its area. If the moving rate increases so that r/zw  
(or r/)w(z −1 ) approaches one, the feasible region reduces and collapses to a lens with 
intersection at (a,0) (or (0,b)) and (1,1), where r/)w(za −−= 11  (and r/zwb −= 1 ).   
 
Throughout this analysis it is assumed that the patches are interdependent, i.e. z is positive. 
Introducing human activity as a fixed positive harvesting rate in this system shifts the Y-
isocline in Figure 1 down, i.e. human activity reduces the density in the outer area for a given 
stock density in the game reserve. Consequently, due to a relative dense population in the 
protected area, wildlife disperses to the outer area, which causes a decline in X. This 
illustrates that harvesting in the outer area spells over to the protected area. The system settles 
in a new stable equilibrium where both stock levels are smaller than their respective carrying 
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capacities and XY < . Throughout the remaining analysis it is assumed that the system is in 
ecological equilibrium ( 0dt/dYdt/dX == ). 
 
3. The economy 
The ecological steady state above was established for a given harvesting rate. However, the 
harvesting activity is determined by economic considerations, which are outlined in this 
section. Before we move to the economic part, it is convenient to establish the different ways 
in which land is utilized in this model.  
 
The local people have legal rights to utilize the outer area in agricultural production and 
wildlife hunting. However, for presumed conservation purposes, the State may expand the 
protected area. This can only take place by implementing parts of the outer land into the park 
area. There are two ways in which the State may accomplish this, and these are related to the 
type of land as discussed in section 1. First, if present, the State can protect non-cultivated 
land. For the local people living in the outer area, this policy represents limited user rights to 
wildlife, but no restriction on the rights to exploit land already cultivated for agricultural use. 
Technically, this will be the case where the constraint on agricultural land is non-binding. 
Second, in marginal areas, the State must expropriate cultivated land in order to expand the 
protected area. For the local people, this procedure restricts their user rights to agricultural 
land as well as their user rights to wildlife. This will be the case when the constraint on 
agricultural land use is binding. The two scenarios of protected area expansion will be 
analysed in section 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.  
 
The next step is to present a formal model of the agricultural and hunting decision of the local 
people. Throughout the analysis the local people are considered a homogenous group of 
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peasants and, in line with traditional reasoning, it is assumed that the elders are in charge of 
the group’s activities (Marks [19]). Agricultural production, which is interpreted as crop 
production, is a function of labour AE  and land L  as )L,E(A A . As mentioned in section 2, 
land is homogeneous as habitat for wildlife. It is therefore convenient to consider land as 
homogeneous for agricultural uses as well. This means that additional land is equally suitable 
in agriculture as previously exploited land. Then, proportional increases in labour effort and 
land use must cause output to increase by the same proportion. Consequently, the average 
returns to land L/A  and labour AE/A  are left unchanged. The agricultural production 
function is therefore characterised by constant returns to scale and specified as a Cobb-
Douglas type as follows (Hayami and Ruttan [14]).  
 
(3) ααμ −= 1LE)L,E(A AA , 
 
Here, μ > 0 is a technology parameter and 0 < α < 1 is the output elasticity of labour. 
Because of its homogeneity, diminishing return to land is not caused by taking inferior land 
into production, but by reduced labour effort per unit of land7. The total area available for 
agricultural production is given by the size of the outer area )w( −1 . The constraint on land 
use is therefore given by  
 
(4) )w(L −≤ 1  
 
As in Bulte and Horan [6], investment costs on land, for instance related to clearing and 
fencing, are ignored in this analysis. The only agricultural cost of consideration is related to 
damage caused by wildlife roaming on agricultural land. The nuisance stream per unit of land 
is equal to cY , with c > 0 and fixed8. Consequently, the total damage of the wildlife roaming 
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on agricultural land is cLY . c is interpreted as the marginal damage per animal. All else 
equal, more agricultural land means more nuisances. 
 
The number of animals harvested H is specified as a function of labour effort hE , stock 
density Y, and the size of the outer area )w( −1 , as )w,Y,E(HH h −= 1 . Because land is 
considered homogenous for agricultural uses in the sense that proportional increases in labour 
and land use cause output to increase by the same proportion, it is also reasonable to assume 
constant return to scale in hunting with respect to labour and land. When assuming that H is 
linear in Y, the wildlife offtake is specified as  
 
(5) YwqEH h
ββ −−= 1)1(  
 
Here, q > 0 is a productivity parameter and 0 < β < 1 is the output elasticity of labour. The 
marginal return to land is positive because additional areas are open for hunting as the outer 
area expands. Diminishing return to land is caused by reduced labour effort per unit of land. 
To translate the offtake into change in the wildlife density in the outer area in (2), we divide 
H with the size of this area, so that )w/(Hh −= 1  is the hunting rate9. 
 
The endowment of labour is normalized to one and, hence, the constraint on labour use 
reads10 
 
(6) 1≤+ Ah EE , 
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Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the constraint is binding. A trade-off between 
wildlife hunting and agricultural production is present in that the opportunity cost of wildlife 
harvesting equals the foregone return from agricultural production (and vice versa). 
 
When inserting for the effort constraint (6) into the production function in (3), the net benefit 
function of the local people yields11 
 
(7) cLYPLEPYwEP AhAhh −−+−= −− ααββ μπ 11 )1()1( , 
 
where hP  and AP  denote the price of game meat and agricultural output, respectively. A 
simplifying assumption is that prices are fixed, meaning that the local people are well 
integrated with markets for agricultural output and game meat. This is in line with Skonhoft 
and Solstad [28]. Whether local people in reality are well integrated with such markets or not 
depends on the level of transaction costs: Using evidence from Serengeti in Tanzania, Barnett 
[1] and Campbell et al. [8] claim that the local people sell game meat at both local and 
external markets. However, Barnett [1] gives a more diverse picture of the market setting for 
game meat when comparing several East- and Southern African countries. Accordingly, 
market setting varies across products and geographical areas. See also Muller and Albers [21] 
for an analysis of the role of the market setting. However, in order to avoid complexity, 
prices are fixed in the present model.  
 
As mentioned, the local people have user rights to land and wildlife. This means that they are 
not granted titles to these resources and, consequently, they face a continuing risk of the State 
withdrawing their user rights through an expansion of the protected area. The local people 
have therefore few, if any, incentives to base their wildlife harvesting on long-term 
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considerations12. Further, the local people are unable to control the wildlife stock due to 
migration between protected land, where wildlife is controlled by the State, and the outer 
area. Because of these reasons, they do not take the stock of wildlife into account when 
deciding upon their effort use. Technically, this is captured by assuming that the local 
peasants treat the stock density Y as exogenous, which is in accordance with one of Smith's 
models [29]. See also Skonhoft and Solstad [28]. The local people choose the hunting effort 
hE  and cultivated land L to maximize (7), given the constraint on land use in (4). The 
Lagrange function reads 
))1(()1()1( 11 wLcLYPLEPYwqEPV AhAhh −−−−−+−= −− λμ ααββ , where λ is the shadow 
price of land. Equations (8)-(10) yield the first order conditions for maximum when an 
interior solution for hunting effort is supposed to be present.  
 
(8) ααββ μαβ −−−− −=− 1111 )1()1( LEPYwEqP hAhh    
 
(9) λαμ αα +=−− − cYPL)E)((P AhA 11  
 
(10) 0≥λ ; 0=λ  if )w1(L −<  
 
Equation (8) shows that the optimal hunting effort is determined by equality between the 
marginal product of hunting and the marginal product of labour effort in agricultural 
production. The decision rule in equation (9) states that the local people will convert land in 
the outer area to agricultural use until the value of the marginal product of land in crop 
production equals the marginal cost. The marginal cost consists of the value of the marginal 
damage per unit cultivated land and the shadow value of land. This value equals zero when 
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the constraint on land use is non-binding, while it is positive for a binding constraint (see 
(10)).  
  
The economic equilibrium condition in (9) is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. Here, the 
marginal benefit and costs of land cultivation are measured along the vertical axis. Consider 
the case of intersection between the marginal cost curve and the marginal benefit curve, 
which results in )w(LL I −<= 1 . This means that the local people choose not to utilize the 
whole outer area for cultivation and, hence, λ = 0. However, a positive shift in agricultural 
productivity μ and/or a downward shift in the marginal crop damage caused by a lower c or 
Y, increase the demand for cultivated land. In Figure 2, this is illustrated by an upward shift in 
the marginal benefit curve caused by a higher μ. For a given land use at IL , the marginal 
benefit of cultivated land exceeds the marginal crop damage by the positive shadow value of 
land. The local people respond by converting additional land to agricultural production. In the 
new equilibrium, λ remains positive if the local people utilize the whole outer area for 
agricultural production, )w(L −= 1 , reflecting that land is a scarce factor. This will be the 
case if μ is ‘high’, while c and Y are ‘low’. In addition, an increase in the size of the protected 
area w shifts the vertical curve denoting the size of the outer area to the left and increases the 
shadow value of land.  
 
 Figure 2 about here 
 
Equation (8)-(10) together with (1) and (2) (with 0dt/dYdt/dX == ) determine the 
optimal hunting effort, optimal use of agricultural land and the aggregate stock in ecological 
equilibrium. The following section describes the two scenarios of a non-binding and a 
binding constraint on land use.  
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4. The impact of protected areas on wildlife conservation and local welfare 
Above we established the first order conditions maximizing the local people’s benefit from 
wildlife harvesting and agricultural production. In addition, we studied the conditions under 
which the system settles in a solution where the constraint on land use is binding. The next 
step is to investigate the impact on wildlife conservation and the welfare of the local people 
of protected areas. It turns out that the effects are strictly dependent on whether the state 
gazettes non-cultivated land or expropriates cultivated land, i.e. whether the constraint on 
land use is non-binding or binding. Section 4.1 considers the case of a non-binding constraint 
on land use, while the constraint is binding in section 4.2.  
 
4.1 The constraint on land use is non-binding 
Assume that the protected area is relatively small, so that land is not a scarce factor in the 
outer area. Then, the local people settle with an interior solution for cultivated land, 
)w(L −< 1 , where the marginal return from land equals the marginal damage in (9) and 
0=λ . Combining (8) and (9) (with 0=λ ) and solving for Y gives 
 
(11) [ ] [ ] [ ] αβαα αβαμ /)1(1 )1/(/)1(/ −− −−= wEcqPPY hhA  
 
Equation (11) and the ecological equilibrium in (1) and (2) (with 0dt/dYdt/dX == ) 
determine the optimal hunting effort and equilibrium stock densities. The aggregate stock 
follows from 0dt/dS = . The amount of cultivated land L is determined through the input 
proportion derived from equation (9). 
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The economic and ecological effects of an expansion of the protected area is found by taking 
the total differential of (11) and (1) and (2) (with 0dt/dYdt/dX == ) (for details, see 
Appendix 2). With a non-binding constraint on land use, the state gazettes non-cultivated 
land when expanding the protected area. This means that more habitat protection displaces 
the local people from pre-hunting areas without restricting their rights to utilize land in 
agricultural production. Alternatively, because land is homogeneous and investment cost in 
land is neglected, this can also be interpreted as a situation where the state gazettes cultivated 
land. Then, without a cost, the local people move their agricultural production to pre-non-
cultivated areas. See also section 5.  
 
In any case, an expansion of the protected area has an unclear effect on the hunting effort. 
Still, this policy unambiguously increases the stock density in the outer area. This gives more 
dispersal into the protected area and leads to a more dense population here. Because of 
increased stock densities, there must be a positive effect on the aggregate stock of gazetting 
non-cultivated land for wildlife protection. The conclusion is therefore that more protection 
gives more wildlife even if the local people increase their hunting effort.   
 
The next step is to investigate how this intervention affects the economic conditions of the 
local people. This is done by taking the differential of (7) with respect to w, when accounting 
for the effect working through a changing stock density (see Appendix, section 2). It turns out 
that the impact on the welfare of the local people is ambiguous. First, and quite in line with 
the findings of Sanchirico and Wilen [25] for a marine reserve, income from hunting 
increases if increased wildlife density compensates for the foregone harvest along the 
protected area expansion. What is new compared to marine reserve creation is that a more 
dense wildlife population imposes increased damage to agricultural crops per unit land. If the 
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latter effect is strong, then gazetting non-cultivated land for habitat protection will promote 
wildlife conservation at the expense of human welfare even if income from hunting increases. 
See also Table 1 in section 4.2.  
 
4.2 The constraint on land use is binding 
Assume that land is a scarce factor to the local people living in the outer area. This is the case 
if, relatively speaking, the protected area is widespread, the agricultural productivity is high, 
and/or the marginal wildlife-induced damage to crops is low. In such a scenario, the local 
people settle in a corner solution for cultivated land, i.e. )w(L −= 1  and 0>λ  from (10). 
Hence, the marginal return on land cultivation exceeds the marginal damage in (9). See also 
Figure 2. Inserting )w(L −= 1  in (8) gives 
 
(12) ααββ μαβ −−−− −−=− 1111 )1()1()1( wEPYwqEP hAhh  
 
Equation (12) states that the local people will divert effort to hunting until the marginal 
benefit of hunting equals the marginal cost. The marginal cost reflects the alternative cost of 
hunting, namely the foregone return on agricultural production. 
 
The economic equilibrium for a given wildlife density in the outer area is illustrated in Figure 
3. Here, the marginal benefit from hunting (MBH) is measured along the left-hand vertical 
axis, while the marginal benefit from agricultural production (MBA) is measured along the 
right-hand axis. The optimal hunting effort is determined by the intersection between the two 
curves.  
 
 Figure 3 about here 
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Equation (12) shows that an expansion of the protected area, i.e. an increase in w , has a 
direct negative effect on the marginal return on labour in agriculture. This is because the State 
must expropriate cultivated land in order to expand the protected area and this is new 
compared to the non-binding case. Consequently, the MBA curve in Figure 3 shifts down, 
which works in the direction of increased hunting effort. However, restricted hunting rights 
reduce the marginal return on hunting, which shifts the MBH curve down. This leads the 
local people to direct less effort towards hunting. The total effect on hunting effort is 
therefore unclear. If restricted hunting rights affect the local people less than reduced 
cultivated land, i.e. <∂∂∂ wEH h2 / wE1A h2 ∂−∂∂ )(/ , they will reply to habitat protection 
by directing more effort to hunting13. This is illustrated in Figure 3 by a stronger downward 
shift in the MBA curve.  
 
If the harvesting effort changes, however, both the wildlife densities and the aggregate stock 
will change, since they all depend on Eh. The first order condition in (12) and the ecological 
equilibrium in (1) and (2) (with 0dt/dYdt/dX == ), determine the optimal hunting effort 
and the stock densities. Again, the aggregate stock follows from 0dt/dS = . Differentiation 
of these equations with respect to w gives the impact of a protected area expansion (for 
details, see Appendix). In contrast to section 4.1, it turns out that the effect on wildlife 
conservation is ambiguous.  
 
The mechanism works as follows. Consider first the direct effect. Because more animals are 
protected from hunting for a given hunting effort, the aggregate stock S increases. Second, we 
have the indirect effect working through the hunting decision of the local people. As 
discussed above, restricted user rights to wildlife reduce the marginal return from labour in 
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hunting, while restricted user rights in agriculture reduce the marginal return from labour in 
crop production. These have opposite effects on the hunting effort. As argued, if the local 
people respond less to the closed hunting ground than the loss of cultivated land, they will 
divert more labour effort towards wildlife exploitation. This will be the case in areas where 
the local people rely heavily on agriculture as a land use so that expropriation of cultivated 
land represents a considerable income loss. In this case, the indirect effect on wildlife 
conservation implies less wildlife in the outer area and a smaller aggregate stock. The total 
effect on wildlife conservation is therefore unclear. Contrary to the non-binding scenario, this 
demonstrates that protected areas which restrict the user rights to wildlife and cultivated land 
may reduce the degree of wildlife conservation. This paradoxical result occurs because the 
constraint on land use in agriculture is binding, meaning that there is an alternative use of the 
protected land in agricultural production.  
 
The final part of this analysis is to investigate how expropriation of cultivated land affects the 
economic conditions of the local people living with wildlife. Again, differentiation of (7) 
with respect to w, when taking into account the effect working via a changing wildlife stock, 
gives the effect on local income in optimum. There are three possible outcomes regarding 
wildlife conservation and local welfare, and these are summarised in the second column of 
Table 1. Assume first that an expansion of the protected area fails and results in a smaller 
degree of wildlife conservation. As reported in the table, this must lead to poorer economic 
conditions for the local people14. The model therefore predicts that where protected areas 
have failed in promoting wildlife conservation, they have also caused a degradation of local 
welfare.  
 
 Table 1 about here 
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Second, assume that an expansion of the protected area promotes wildlife conservation. As 
shown in Table 1, the resulting effect on local welfare is ambiguous and dependent on 
whether the marginal return on hunting with respect to the wildlife stock (1-w)Y is above or 
below the marginal agricultural damage with respect to (1-w)Y and the size of the moving 
rate of wildlife. See (A7) in Appendix. If the marginal damage exceeds the marginal return on 
hunting, i.e. PA and c are ‘high’ and Ph is ‘low’, then protected areas resulting in a higher 
degree of wildlife conservation will unambiguously reduce the welfare of the local people. 
See the fourth column of Table 1. If, on the other hand, the marginal return on hunting 
exceeds the marginal damage (i.e. Ph is ‘high’ and PA and c are ‘low’), then protected areas 
will promote both wildlife conservation and local welfare if increased hunting income due to 
an increased wildlife stock in the outer area, compensates for the foregone return from pre-
agricultural land. This will be the case if the agricultural productivity is ‘low’. See the fifth 
column of Table 1.  
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Establishing national parks and other types of protected areas have been the traditional 
approach to natural resource conservation in Africa. However, this practise has during the 
past decade been subject for debate: While, e.g., Martin [20] argues that small budgets and 
funds causes protected areas to fail in preserving wildlife, Bruner et al. [5] claim that 
protected areas work well.  
 
This debate is the starting point of the present paper. In line with the findings of Bruner et al. 
[5] the ecological model implies that, in presence of hunting in the outer area, the wildlife 
density in the protected area is higher compared with the outer area. In contrast to Martin 
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[20], however, it is assumed that anti-poaching law enforcement succeeds in eliminating 
illegal hunting in the protected area. Still, this demonstrates that protected areas may cause 
wildlife degradation.  
 
The ecosystem of consideration in this paper is of fixed size and consists of two sub-areas – 
the protected area and the outer area – over which the wildlife stock disperses. The outer area 
is settled by humans who utilize this area for wildlife hunting and agricultural production. 
The local people have user rights to wildlife and land for cultivation in the outer area, but 
they do not have the property rights. Related to the land use in the outer area, this paper 
distinguishes between two ways of gazetting land. First, the state gazettes non-cultivated 
land. This policy restricts the local people’s user rights to wildlife by withdrawing former 
hunting grounds without interfering with their rights to cultivate land. Technically, this is the 
case where the constraint on land use is non-binding. Second, the state expropriates cultivated 
land, a policy which restricts the local people’s user rights to both wildlife and land for 
cultivation. In this scenario, the constraint on land use is binding. 
 
The main point of the analysis is to find out under which conditions protected areas may fail 
in conserving wildlife. In addition, the analysis focuses on the economic impact of protected 
areas by investigating the effect on local welfare. It is shown that the actual outcome of 
habitat protection depends critically on whether the constraint on land use is binding. Only 
when the constraint is non-binding will protected areas with certainty increase the wildlife 
stock. This scenario is quite similar to a marine reserve creation with no alternative use of the 
marine habitat. However, in contrast to marine reserves, the impact on the welfare of the local 
people is unclear, even if increased wildlife density compensates for the foregone harvest on 
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the pre-hunting grounds: Then a double payoff occurs only if damage imposed by wildlife to 
agriculture is small.   
 
Protected areas work quite differently from marine reserves when the constraint on land use 
is binding and the State expropriates cultivated land for wildlife protection. The discrepancy 
stems from the alternative use of protected land as land for agricultural production. The 
model demonstrates that an expansion of the protected area may cause a degradation of 
wildlife if the productivity of labour in agriculture is more sensitive to restricted access to 
land than the productivity of labour in hunting. If this is the case, then the local people will 
compensate themselves by devoting more time on hunting. In the opposite case, the local 
people respond to land expropriation by spending less time hunting and, consequently, the 
wildlife stock increases. A double payoff will then emerge if wildlife-induced damage to 
agricultural crops is small and increased wildlife dispersal from the protected area 
compensates for the foregone wildlife harvest and agricultural production along the protected 
area expansion.   
 
Hence, with respect to wildlife conservation, this model predicts that protected areas work 
well in areas where uncultivated land is gazetted, while the success of expropriating 
cultivated land is conditioned on how sensitive local people are to changes in the size of the 
area available for cultivation. A more promising way of promoting wildlife conservation than 
expropriating cultivated land may be to encourage improved productivity in agriculture 
(increased μ, see Appendix section 2). The impact on local welfare is, however, still unclear. 
But if the level of agricultural damage per animal is ‘small’, then improved agricultural 
productivity will promote both wildlife conservation and local welfare. This kind of support 
is often found in existing ICDPs (see section 1).   
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It is important to note that this model simplifies the interaction between the wildlife 
population dynamics and human activities. In the ecological part of the model, the quality of 
land as habitat for wildlife is considered constant and independent of the agricultural use in 
the outer area. In reality, however, unexploited areas may generate more wildlife than 
cultivated land. Hence, the analysis overlooks one plausible positive effect on wildlife 
conservation as protected areas displace agricultural activities in the wildlife habitat.  
 
Another simplification made is to assume that land conversion is costless. In the non-binding 
scenario this assumption may be interpreted as if the State offers the local community full 
compensation for any costs of moving the agricultural production to pre non-cultivated areas. 
The conservation effect of expropriating pre-cultivated land will then be identical to that of 
gazetting non-cultivated land. The case of a binding constraint on land use may, on the other 
hand, be considered as a situation where the local people receive no compensation for the loss 
of agricultural land and where high conversion costs therefore prevent the local people from 
moving to pre non-cultivated areas.  
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Figure 1: Ecological equilibrium in absence of man.  
0dt/dY =  
0dt/dX =
Figure 2: The maximum condition for the amount of cultivated 
land L. Y and Eh are fixed. 
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Figure 3: The maximum condition for hunting effort Eh. The constraint 
on land is binding. Dashed curves represent increased habitat protection 
(w), Y is fixed.                                    
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Tables 
 
  
   Table 1: The welfare effect of an increase in w in equilibrium.    
  Non-binding constraint  
 on land use 
 Binding constraint on land use* 
S     +  ÷                           + 
 
π 
    ÷∗∗ 
PA and c high 
and 
Ph low  
         +∗∗ 
PA and c low, 
and 
Ph high, 
 ÷ 
  
 
 ÷∗∗  
PA and c high 
and 
Ph low 
 +∗∗ 
PA, c and μ low, 
and 
Ph high, 
   * The welfare effect is conditioned by the impact on wildlife conservation. 
   ** Here, it is assumed that the wildlife stock in the outer area increases, 01 >− dw/Y)w(d .   
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Appendix 
1. The ecological system 
The shapes of the X-isocline and Y-isocline in Figure 1 are found by taking the differential of 
(1) (with dX/dt = 0) and (2) (with dY/dt = 0), respectively, with respect to X and Y, and are 
given as [ ] )(/)()(/
/
w1zw1zX21rdXdY
0dtdX
−−−−−==  and 
[ ]zwY21rzwdXdY
0dtdY
−−−== )(// /  in the (X,Y)-plane. The second order differentials show 
that the X-isocline is convex, while the Y-isocline is concave. Hence, an interior solution of 
the ecological system (X > 0 and Y > 0) requires the X-isocline to intersect the Y-isocline from 
below. That is, [ ] 0w1zX21r <−−− )()(  and [ ] 0zwY21r <−− )( . These signs are useful for 
the comparative static analyses below.  
    
Consider the differentiation of the ecological system in case of exogenous changes in the size 
of the protected area w and the hunting effort Eh. The total differential of the ecological 
equilibrium 0dt/dYdt/dX == in (1) and (2) when Yw1Eqh h β))/(( −=   yields  
 
(A1) 
dq
Yw1E
0
dE
w1Yw1Eq
0
dw
w1Yw1EqXYz
XYz
dY
dX
w1EqzwY21rzw
w1zw1zX21r
h
h1
h
1
h
h
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−+−
−=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−−
−−−−
−
−
ββ
β
β
β
β
))/(()/())/((
)/())/(()(
)(
))/(()(
)()()(
 
 
The determinant [ ][ ] )())/(()()()( w1wzw1EqzwY21rw1zX21rD 2h −−−−−−−−−= β  is 
positive from the condition of ecological stability.  
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2. Non-binding constraint on land use                                                
Differentiation of (11) gives   
 
(A2) [ ] [ ] [ ]{ }dYw11w1Ec1qPP1dE 11h1hAh )(/)()/(/)(// /)( −−−−= −−− αβαβαμ αβαα
 [ ] [ ] [ ] μαβαγ αβαα dw1Ec1qPP1dww1E 1h1hAh /)()/(/)(/)/()/( −− −−−−−  
 [ ] [ ] [ ] A1h1hAA dPw1Ec1qPPP αβαα αβαγαμ /)()/(/)(/)/( −− −−−  
 [ ] [ ] [ ] dcw1Ec1qPPc1 1h1hA αβαα αβαγμα /)()/(/)(/)/)(( −− −−−+  
 [ ] [ ] [ ] h1h1hAh dPw1Ec1qPPP αβαα αβαγμ /)()/(/)(/)/( −− −−+  
 [ ] [ ] [ ] dqw1Ec1qPPq 1h1hA αβαα αβαγμ /)()/(/)(/)/( −− −−+  
 
where [ ] [ ] [ ] 0w11w1Ec1qPP 11h1hA >−−−−= −−− )(/)()/(/)(/ /)( αβαβαμγ αβαα . Define ημ 
as the term multiplied by dμ, 
AP
η  as the term multiplied by dPA etc. in (A2). Then, when 
inserting (A2) in (A1), the comparative static results yield (A3) 
 
[ ]
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hP
1
h
1
hh
dP
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0
d
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0
dw
XYz
XYz
dY
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A
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
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The determinant   
[ ][ ] )()(/))/(())/(()()()( w1wzw1Yw1Eqw1EqzwY21rw1zX21r 21hh −−−−−−−−−−−− − γβ ββ
is positive from the condition of ecological stability. The corresponding change in the 
aggregate stock density equals dw)XY(dY)w1(wdXdS −−−+= , while the impact on Eh 
is given in (A2). 
 
The impact on local welfare of an expansion of the protected area is found by differentiating 
(7) with respect to w, making use of the first order conditions in (8) and (9) (with λ=0), and 
rearrange:  
 
(A4) [ ] dwcLdYPY1dwdYw1w1w1EqPw Ahh /)(/)()())/((/ −−−−−−=∂∂ − βπ ββ  
 
where dY/dw is derived from differentiation of (A3). The first term dwdYw1 /)( −  in the 
bracket reflects that income from hunting increases due to increased stock density in the outer 
area, while the second term Y1 )( β−−  reflects reduced income from hunting due to the 
foregone return from the pre-hunting ground. The final term dwcLdYPA /−  implies reduced 
income due to increased crop damage per unit agricultural land.  
 
3. Binding constraint on land use 
The final step is to investigate the impact of an expansion of the protected area when the 
constraint on land use is binding. Differentiation of (12) and rearranging yields  
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(A5) 
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From (A1) dY can be expressed as a function of dEh, dw and dq. Inserting this function into 
(A5) gives dEh as a function of dw, hdP , dq, AdP  and dμ. When inserting for dY and dX from 
(A1) into dw)XY(dY)w1(wdXdS −−−+= , dS is expressed as a function of dEh, dw, hdP , 
dq, AdP  and dμ. Together, these expressions give to equations in two endogenous variables, 
dS and dEh, and five exogenous, dw, hdP , dq, AdP  and dμ: 
 
(A6) 
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Here the first row refers to the economic part of the model, while the second row refers to the 
ecological part. The sign of 
Yw1qEP1w1E1P1 12hh
12
hA
ββαα ββμααδ −−−− −−−−−−−= )()()()()(  
[ ] Dw1Eqw1zX21rw1qEP 1h11hh /))/(()()()( −−− −−−−−+ ββββ  is negative and, hence, the 
determinant is positive. The sign of [ ] Dzww1zX21rYw1Eq 1h /)()())/(( −−−−−−= −ββσ  
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is positive, while the signs of  
[ ][ ] Dzww1zX21rYw1EqYXw1zYX h /)()())/(())(()( −−−−−−−−−−= ββθ  
[ ] Dw1Eqw1zzwY21rYXzw h /))/(()()()( β−−−−−−−−  and 
11
hA w1E1P
−−− −−−= αβαμβαατ )()()(  
[ ][ ]{ } DXYwzw1Yw1EqXYzw1zX21rw1qEP 2h11hh /)()/())((()()()()( −−−−+−−−−−− −− βββ ββ
 are unclear.  
 
Again, the welfare effect is derived from the differentiation of (7) with respect to w, using the 
first order condition in (12), and rearrange: 
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Solving (A5) for dY/dw yields 
[ ][ ] [ ]{ } dwdEw1qEPYw1qEP1w1E1P1 w1qEPw1E1PdwdY h11hh12hh12hA
11
hh
11
hA
/)(/)()()()()(
)(/)()()(/
ββββαα
ββαβα
βββμαα
βμβαα
−−−−−−
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When inserting for dEh/dw from (A6), this expression shows the impact of a protected area 
expansion on the wildlife density in the outer area in equilibrium.   
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Notes 
                                                 
1 When analysing the role of market setting, however, Muller and Albers [21] demonstrate that the 
conservation-effect of payments may be negative in case of a missing market for extracted resources.  
  
2 In a state property regime individuals or groups may be allowed to make use of the natural resources 
without having any property rights. Bromley [4] defines this as usufruct rights.  
 
3 Muller and Albers [21] analyses the likelihood of success of different policies of conservation of 
terrestrial species in protected areas under different assumptions about the market setting. However, 
they do not consider the impact of altering the size of the protected area.   
 
4 Incompatibility also implies that the rate of migration is independent on the type of territory animals 
traverse. 
 
5 The moving rate may also be related to breeding. For instance, animals with slow growing non-
precocial young are obliged to stay within a small area to breed. This is the case for carnivores like 
lions and hyenas. In contrast, ungulates with precocial young do not need to stay in one place because 
the young can follow the mother within an hour or so of birth ([9]).   
 
6 The stability conditions read 0)zr2(Y/)1,1(gX/)1,1(f <+−=∂∂+∂∂  and 
0)zr(r)X/)1,1(g)(Y/)1,1(f()Y/)1,1(g)(X/)1,1(f( >+=∂∂∂∂−∂∂∂∂ , where 
))(()(),( XYw1zX1rXYXf −−+−=  and )()(),( YXzwY1rYYXg −+−= .   
 
7 For linear homogeneous or constant return to scale production functions, the marginal products are 
independent of scale and depend only on the input proportions. 
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8 In reality, the local people can perform damage control through fencing, guard patrols and so forth. 
In the model this would have worked through a changing c. Here, such measures are neglected. 
 
9 As in Barrett and Arcese [2], Lopez [18], Skonhoft [26], Skonhoft and Solstad [28], and Bulte and 
van Soest [7], hunting by outsiders and professional gangs is ignored.  
 
10 No market is assumed to exist for labour. This is representative for many local communities close to 
remote protected areas where most people own land and rely heavily on income from agricultural 
production. Campbell et al. [8] give evidence from Serengeti, Tanzania. See Muller and Albers [21] 
for an analysis of the role of the market setting. In the present model a perfect labour market makes 
protected areas effective: With a fixed wage rate and no constraint on working hours in employment, 
a labour market eliminates the interaction between hunting and agriculture in the effort decision.  
 
11 In accordance with the traditions in the past century, it is assumed that no economic compensation 
is paid to the local people for the loss of access to land and wildlife (Marks [19], Kiss [16], Swanson 
and Barbier [31], Wells [33]). 
 
12 Martin [20] points out how the risk of land expropriation affects landholders. He writes (p. 15):  
“The influence of the preservationist lobby is a serious disincentive for the landholder contemplating 
an investment in wildlife as a land use”. See also Borrini [3]. 
 
13 As seen in (A5) in Appendix, this is the case when α>β. 
 
14 Obviously, protection of agricultural land cannot promote local welfare at the expense of wildlife 
conservation. dπ/dw>0 together with dS/dw<0 must imply that the local people were utilizing ‘too 
much’ land for agricultural production prior to the expansion of the protected area. In this case, profit-
maximization requires the local people to choose an interior solution for cultivated land. 
